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TEACHING LEGAL PROFESSION: 
ETHICS UNDER THE MODEL RULES 
DENNIS J. TUCHLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
How and why does one deal with questions of ethics1 in a course on the 
law governing lawyers?  Most of the discussion in the course focuses on the 
applicable rules governing the conduct of lawyers.  Those rules can be 
criticized in terms of the harm they allow to flow from the representation of a 
client, in the light of the social benefits purportedly furthered by those rules.  
The student might even be asked to discuss the possibility of civil disobedience 
in the interests of justice.  But some of the applicable rules address the 
student’s ethics directly.  This is because in application the rules might be 
ambiguous as to what they require or allow the lawyer to do, and because some 
of the rules even give the lawyer discretion to act to the client’s disadvantage.  
When ethics is discussed, it is not discussed as instruction in ethics, but rather 
in terms of a student’s own sense—one already developed through 
enculturation and socialization—of what a person should do under the 
circumstances and how the decision about what to do is tied up with the social 
circumstances in which the agent acts.  This essay focuses on how to approach 
the ethical questions that arise under these permissive rules.  One such question 
might be whether those permissive rules are actually permissive or whether 
conduct to the client’s disadvantage allowed by such a rule is not in fact, under 
 
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  My colleagues, John 
Griesbach, Alan Howard, and Michael Korybut read a draft of this paper and made very helpful 
comments. 
 1. Or “morals,” if you wish.  The two terms are often used interchangeably.  Among 
lawyers and other regulated professionals, “ethics” is often taken to mean the positive rules 
governing conduct by those professionals by virtue of their profession being state-regulated.  
“Morals,” on the other hand, cover what a lawyer should do, all things considered, or how the 
lawyer should live, including norms of conduct that relate to the relationship between a person 
and a deity.  I use the term “ethics” to refer to norms governing conduct in society.  The term 
might also be used to describe what a virtuous person would do under the circumstances.  What a 
person should do can refer to conduct relative to animals, if one includes them as proper objects 
of social concern, and to conduct relative to future generations (e.g., conduct relating to the 
environment and the consumption of non-renewable natural resources), depending on how one 
understands what “society” includes. 
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the circumstances, mandatory.  Another such question might be whether the 
lawyer can waive the opportunity to take advantage of the rule by agreement 
with the client or otherwise simply ignore that rule’s permission. 
Ethics is presented as role differentiated, rather than the ethics of the 
“ordinary person.”  This position is set out in Part II.A. of the essay.  The 
importance to the lawyer’s ethics of the duty of loyalty is set out in Part II.B.  
The largest part of this essay deals with the relatively little-discussed problem 
of what the lawyer does once this duty of loyalty is set aside by the applicable 
rules.  This part begins at Part II.C. and is developed in Part II.D. 
I.  THE DIFFERENCE OF LEGAL PROFESSION 
The course in the profession of law is importantly different from other law 
school courses taught three hours a week to second-year and third-year law 
students.2  For the most part, however, that difference is not apparent.  In terms 
of training in legal skills, a course in the legal profession is not different from 
other upper-division courses when it comes to the intellectual and rhetorical 
skills that are developed.3  Legal profession can be taught profitably as a 
classroom course, in a seminar, in a clinic, or in a pseudo-clinic (e.g., 
negotiation, trial practice, or client counseling in which there is no actual 
client).4  As is the case in some upper-division courses, this course may require 
some knowledge of material taught in courses, many of which most of the 
students have not yet taken.5  It also refers to areas of knowledge to which 
most of the students have not been exposed to any substantial degree.6 
 
 2. At St. Louis University, the course, called “Legal Profession,” is taken by second-year 
students with only a sprinkling of third-year students. 
 3. It is a useful vehicle to teach the drafting and interpretation of written law, analysis and 
solution of legal problems, and client counseling.  The usual arguments as to the best way to get 
the material to the students—Socratic dialogue, lecture, question-and-answer, the assignment of a 
paper or papers, etc.—apply here as they do to any other course. 
 4. Or, it might be taught as part of several courses, in which the legal and ethical problems 
of lawyers are raised in the context of advising clients.  See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 4–5 (2d ed. 1998). 
 5. Depending on the semester, many of the students have had or are currently taking 
Business Associations, so they are somewhat conversant with the law of agency and the law of 
partnerships and corporations.  This is similar for a course in the law of evidence.  All of the 
students have had the Constitutional Law course that deals with federalism and separation of 
powers, but most have not yet had much exposure to the law of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Nor have most of them had a course in securities regulation, criminal 
procedure, or jurisprudence.  If the course is to include discussion of problems relating to 
representation of estates, corporations, or partnerships, the instructor will have to provide the 
missing information by lecture or additional reading assignments. 
 6. These areas include: ethics, moral philosophy, or the social sciences, other than perhaps 
economics.  Many instructors are also not well trained in any such fields before coming to this 
course. 
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A course about the legal profession differs from other courses in two 
important ways.  First, this is a course in the rules that will be applicable to the 
students themselves when (if) they begin to practice.  They are encouraged to 
take this course personally.  Second, the course includes a substantial reference 
to ethics, in part because some of the law governing the practice of law makes 
room for discretion which can be exercised, at times, to the detriment of the 
client!.  The course is about the students themselves if they go on to practice 
law. 
The first difference, the course’s relevance to the student’s own future life 
as a lawyer, should make the course of more than ordinary importance to the 
future practicing lawyer.  Because it is about the student’s own future life as a 
lawyer, it should be the most important course to the student who expects to 
practice law.  Yet, this does not appear always to be the case.  To be sure, there 
is the risk of bar sanctions and loss of license for misconduct and perhaps 
court-imposed sanctions, and that should get the student’s attention.  But that 
threat does not seem to fix the student’s mind and is softened even more by 
some of the students’ experiences over the preceding summer in law offices. 
As to the second difference, why ethics?  The positivistic bias of most law 
schools makes ethics seem to be a strange kind of thing for a lawyer to study.  
There’s law and there’s morals, and while the first can be discussed and dealt 
with in law school, the second is too difficult for the law student or the lawyer 
to deal with.  But in a course in the practice of law, students should constantly 
face the question, “What should I do in this case?”  That question might be 
dealt with by reference to rules of law, except when the rule is unclear and 
choices must be made between alternatives, or when the rule itself gives the 
lawyer a chance to exercise discretion, even to the disadvantage of the client.  
This referral of the student to her own present and future ethics seems to 
weaken the intellectual attraction of the course for students, even if the ethics 
of lawyers is an acceptable subject for study.  Most of the students seem to 
have already decided that “ethics” is a matter of ordinary sense.  In a way, the 
students’ view is justified.  What students (and the rest of us) know about 
proper conduct comes from a long period of socialization during which they 
became acquainted with those cultural norms that have been worked out to 
regulate social life.  Figuring out what to do is not a matter of proceeding from 
general value statements to rules of conduct to applications; it is a matter of 
taking what one knows about how to act in particular cases and reasoning from 
that knowledge of ordinary rules to determine what to do in this case.  When I 
engage students (and others) in ethical discourse, that is exactly how they think 
about what one should do in particular circumstances.7  Rarely do I hear any 
 
 7. One of these circumstances is the position of the agent (e.g., lawyer) in the social system 
and another is the relationship that a person in that position has with the person or persons 
affected by the lawyer’s conduct.  One of the things that the student should take away from this 
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mention of categorical imperatives, utility or cultural values, or religious 
teaching about the propriety of goals or the resolution of dispute.  Rarely do I 
hear a student refer to what a virtuous person would do, although there are 
often vacuous references to “professionalism,” which could simply be a matter 
of etiquette.8 
The student’s thinking about what to do as a lawyer is made to appear to be 
relatively simple by the student’s initial understanding of the lawyer’s roles in 
the adversary system—defined in part by the lawyer’s duty of loyal and 
enthusiastic aid to clients’ pursuit of their own ends.9  That takes care of a 
great deal for the student, so long as the student’s personal interests as a future 
lawyer are not involved in the discussion.  The context of the adversary system 
seems to simplify the lawyer’s professional life because, to the student, the 
client’s interests seem always to trump.  There are rules that limit the duty of 
loyalty, of course, but those rules can be read in terms of the primary 
importance of a lawyer’s pursuit of success for the client.  For example, the 
student may not help a client violate law,10 but the student already knows how 
to interpret the law in a way most likely to overcome limitations on the 
achievement of the client’s goals.11  Much of this verbal positioning is 
reinforced by a strong desire for personal success.  Hence any reading of a rule 
that enhances the adversarial nature of the lawyer’s job by reducing its 
complications, the more attractive that reading seems to be.  The student’s 
acceptance of a strong duty of loyalty to the client (as opposed to simple goal 
orientation) can be tested in cases in which serving the client involves a 
possible detriment to the lawyer’s own interests,12 including the concern the 
 
course is the danger that the role-required conduct may affect the person when in another position 
(e.g., parent, director, legislator) and other relationships. 
 8. I don’t do a great deal with “professionalism.”  That is, in part, because of my doubts as 
to the practical utility of the concept as it is developed.  On the other hand, the instructor might 
want to develop the theme of the virtuous lawyer and pose the question “How should I live?” 
rather than “What should I do?”  The former question is addressed to the virtuous lawyer; the 
latter to the lawyer concerned with rules and principles. The usual focus of the course is on rules 
and principles of right conduct, which fits into the student’s own thinking about ethics.  Can one 
teach virtue?  One can certainly teach about it in the sense that one can ask the student what kind 
of a person would do X in these circumstances, whether or not X is conduct required by the 
applicable rules.  For some informative material on virtue ethics in bite-sized form, see generally 
HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE? ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
 9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007). 
 10. See id. at R. 1.2(d). 
 11. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the 
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995). 
 12. I rarely find students who (even with prompting) are taken aback by the “self defense” 
rule of Model Rule 1.6(b)(2): 
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: . . . to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
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student may have with the avoidance of (unnecessary or unreasonable) harm to 
others. 
II.  ETHICS UNDER THE RULES 
How should the instructor approach questions of ethics?  Can the instructor 
speak coherently about ethics in general or about the ethics of the ordinary 
person?  In general, all will likely agree that ethics includes at least a 
prohibition on doing harm to others.  Also, most will agree that, ordinarily, one 
ought to treat all as equally entitled to concern and aid.13  Any departure from 
such general norms should be justified or (at least) excused, if it is to be 
accepted as the act of an ethical person.  But, what of the claim by lawyers that 
they must be allowed (indeed, are often required) to do things to others that 
“ordinary persons” would find unethical?  Doesn’t that claim mark lawyers as 
unethical persons when they prefer the goals of their clients to the welfare of 
others and harm others for their clients’ sakes? 
A. Ethics is Role-Differentiated 
Near the beginning of the course, the lawyer’s normative universe should 
be considered in the light of Professor Wasserstrom’s famous article on role 
differentiation and the ethics of lawyers.14  The usual opposition suggested by 
 
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against 
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client . . . . 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007).  Additionally, very few are bothered by 
the very broad reading given “reasonably necessary” under the guidance of Meyerhofer v. Empire 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974).  For an analysis of the self-defense 
exception, see Jennifer Cunningham, Eliminating “Backdoor” Access to Client Confidences: 
Restricting the Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992 
(1990). 
 13. The principles of “do no harm” and “treat all equally” are limited, of course, by the 
problem of whether one can require heroic altruism of a person.  My position in class and in 
general is that one is not expected to be heroic.  The second proposition—that one should treat all 
persons equally—is controversial in its plain statement, e.g., in a culture that is strictly stratified 
on the basis of birth or tribe, and is usually qualified by reference to “similar cases.”  For an 
interesting and short discussion of “equality,” see BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS 
THE DEED chs. 8–9 (2005). 
 14. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 
(1975) (arguing that all persons are subject to the ordinary requirements of ethics unless some 
differentiation is justified by the role of the agent, and that the agent claiming that differentiation 
has the burden of proof with respect to the desirability of the conduct in question).  Therefore, 
role differentiation is really an exception to the general norms applicable to all persons.  
However, it is not clear from the article what kinds of arguments would carry the burden in favor 
of role differentiation.  See also ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 2–8 (1980).  Goldman distinguishes between strong and weak role 
differentiation, associates the former with professional role differentiation (physicians and 
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Professor Wasserstrom and other commentators is between what the lawyer 
does and what the ordinary person should do under similar circumstances.15  I 
think this approach is misleading because it is too simple; it does not take 
account of the problems of persons acting in various relationships in the work-
a-day world.16  That is, there is no “ordinary person” acting as such in a social 
system sufficiently complex to include lawyers.17  To be sure, we learn what to 
do in general in generally-stated propositions; we learn about what to do in the 
various occasions in which we interact with others.  As we learn how to live in 
society, we ingest broad concepts like “play fair,” “don’t harm,” and “treat 
people equally,” but we understand them in terms of what we are doing at the 
time as we are encumbered by the expectations attached to particular positions 
and relationships in the social system. 
A person who is a lawyer also holds other positions in the social system.  
She may be a parent, a scout leader, a member of a religious organization’s 
governing board, a holder of political office, a business partner, a teacher, etc.  
In each such position, she has many different relationships with others in the 
social system, to each of which is attached certain expectations on both sides 
of that relationship.  So, a parent has a particular relationship with each child, 
with a spouse, with the children’s teachers, and with others who somehow are 
related to the child.  A law professor has a role with respect to each student, 
with respect to colleagues, administrators, perhaps donors, and faculty from 
 
lawyers), and asserts and argues that strong role differentiation must be justified by showing that 
it is: (a) “necessary to the fulfillment of [the relevant professional] function” and (b) “justified in 
terms of the deeper moral teleology of [the] profession.  It must be shown that some central 
institutional value will fail to be realized without the limitation or augmentation of [the 
professional’s] authority or [moral] responsibility, and that the realization of this value is worth 
the moral price paid for strong role differentiation.”  Id. at 7; see id. at 31–33. 
 15. See Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 5. 
 16. The following discussion of the lawyer’s roles follows generally ROBERT K. MERTON, 
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 422–34 (1968 Enlarged Edition).  Merton takes the 
position of “Lawyer” or “Parent” to be a “status,” one of a cluster of statuses.  Id. at 422–24.  
Each status has a “role set,” which is a “complement of role relationships which persons have by 
virtue of occupying a particular social status. Id. at 423.  The utility of “role” to sociology is 
attacked in Margaret A. Coulson, Role: A Redundant Concept in Sociology? Some Educational 
Considerations, in ROLE 107 (J.A. Jackson ed., 1972).  I agree that my reference to the role 
relationship between the lawyer and third persons affected by the representation, but not in direct 
interaction with the lawyer, is a stretch. 
 17. Role differentiation as a justification for particular conduct is controversial.  Strong 
opposition to role differentiation is found, for example, in the writings of David Luban.  See, e.g., 
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104–27 (1988) (arguing that there 
is something left of the individual human being after accounting for role, and that both the 
individual and the ethics of role are subject to universally valid norms of conduct).  For instance, 
compare Merton’s analysis on the interaction between cultural norms (Luban’s universally valid 
norms of conduct?) with social norms that guide conduct of persons occupying roles.  See infra 
note 21. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] TEACHING LEGAL PROFESSION 1167 
other schools.  Each of these roles carries its own expectations on both sides of 
the relationship.  None of these relationships can function in the social system 
without some “reasonableness”-type modifications of general ethical principles 
attached to conduct.  So, the general principle of equality among people in 
right and desert has to be modified in order to accommodate the preference that 
one friend gives the other friend over all others.18  There can be no effective 
duty of loyalty without some modification of this general principle of equality.  
Similarly, the principle of “do no harm” has to be modified to accommodate 
the actions of surgeons, policemen, soldiers, lawyers, and others who, in order 
to carry out their functions, must do harm and must treat people unequally. 
Role differentiation in ethics then, is not really simply an exception from 
the general behavioral norms that regulate social life in the social system.  
Rather it is a feature of the web of norms that allow the socially useful 
provision of services to persons.  So, with respect to his role as agent of a 
client, a lawyer’s attention to the general norm of equality of all19 is not the 
same as that of the parent with respect to child or spouse, or the policeman 
with respect to the enforcement of the criminal law, nor (again in the role of 
client’s agent) is the lawyer’s compliance with the norm of not harming others 
similar to that of the baker with respect to customers or creditors, or the judge 
with respect to fellow judges, parties, or clerks.  At the level of application, the 
norms that guide conduct allow the provider of socially useful services to 
provide them.  But to the extent that the costs20 of allowing the lawyer these 
 
 18. A famous and controversial article by Professor Charles Fried tries to assimilate the 
status of lawyer to that of friend.  See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).  See the caustic response 
in the form of a letter to the editors of the Yale Law Journal from Edward A. Dauer and Arthur 
Allen Leff, suggesting other moral analogs to the lawyer.  See Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen 
Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977). 
 19. Consider the general ethical principle that all are equally entitled to equal treatment, and 
the lawyer’s relationship to the general community with respect to the availability of legal 
assistance.  The lawyer need not treat all applicants for the lawyer’s services equally to the extent 
that time and resources allow at the time(s) the question of whether and how to provide services 
to a particular person comes up.  If the question is whether to discontinue services, the answer is 
limited by Model Rule 1.16.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2007).  But if the 
question is taking on a new case, the lawyer may refuse to take any case and limit the degree to 
which the lawyer takes it for any reason.  See id. at R. 1.2(c).  The lawyer is not a public utility, 
required to provide service to all comers.  Should that be the case?  If it is the case, why is it?  
Part of the reason might be that a rule requiring the lawyer to serve all comers, subject to 
available resources, is not hard to evade by colorable claims concerning the lawyer’s competence 
and available resources, and perhaps moral compunctions.  Another part has to do with the strong 
value placed on individual autonomy in our culture. 
 20. For one way to calculate the costs and benefits see GOLDMAN supra note 14.  It is also 
worth asking whether the most important voice in determining the costs and benefits of role-
differentiated ethics is the practicing bar or whether a stronger voice should be given to the lay 
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variations exceed the social value of the service, they will be held 
“unreasonable” and the lawyer’s conduct will be condemned as unethical.  
This should lead to modification of the lawyer’s role-ethics in question.21  
Indeed, many social roles are unacceptable and the role-expectations 
unreasonable.  Consider the role of a criminal with respect to the victims of a 
crime. 
The many roles played by the lawyer as such and in other positions in 
society are not hermetically sealed as against each other, and the lawyer.  The 
demands of roles and of role-partners can conflict.  The lawyer’s roles with 
respect to different clients, for example, can conflict in terms of attention given 
to each client’s needs.  Behavior and attitudes learned in a particular role may 
bleed over into the lawyer’s conduct as parent or legislator or friend.  Some 
roles’ demands may be sufficiently at odds with the lawyer’s view of herself 
that she will attempt to avoid as much apparent personal involvement in the act 
and its consequences as possible.22  A lawyer representing a party bears a 
particular relationship as a disinterested and trusted participant to 
governmental and private agencies that hear claims and attempt to settle 
disputes.  There are expectations of candor and conformity to relevant rules 
and norms governing conduct that may compete with the expectations of the 
client for zealous pursuit of the client’s ends and the preservation of 
confidences.  The lawyer also has relationships to persons, other than the 
client, affected by the representation and relationships with other lawyers who 
 
public, for example, by doing away with the claim by some state supreme courts that the 
regulation of the bar is their exclusive province. 
 21. Merton insists on keeping cultural norms separate from social norms, the former 
including morals.  MERTON, supra note 16, at 216.  He warns that “[w]hen the cultural and the 
social structure are malintegrated, the first calling for behavior and attitudes which the second 
precludes, there is a strain toward the breakdown of the norms, toward normlessness” (anomie).  
Id. at 217.  Such malintegration could also serve as a reason for changing the balance among the 
various roles of a lawyer in particular cases, as an exception to the duty of loyalty or 
confidentiality, perhaps in favor of third persons.  Consider, for example, the adjustment to the 
duty of confidentiality in order to take into account the special value of human life and physical 
safety.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007).  Additionally, compare this with 
the less protective treatment of third persons’ property interests.  Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) & 4.1.  
That is, the person occupying a role is also conscious of limits imposed on that role’s ethics by 
the more general requirements of the culture in which that role is executed.  That awareness can 
produce tensions in the agent when the apparent requirements of the role seem to conflict with 
these general ethical limitations.  This tension could lead to anomie but it also could lead to 
reformist tendencies or a decision, in particular cases, simply to ignore the rule applicable to the 
role insofar as it is in conflict with the relevant cultural norms. 
 22. See Chad Gordon, Role and Value Development Across the Life-Cycle, in ROLE 65, 69 
(J.A. Jackson ed., 1972).  The concept of Role Distance is used by Prof. Luban to argue that there 
is an authentic, extra-role person functioning as a moral agent in each person acting in the social 
system.  See LUBAN, supra note 17, at 106–07 (referring to the work of the sociologist Erving 
Goffman). 
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practice in the lawyer’s community, whether territorially or professionally 
defined.  Like any other person in a community, a lawyer has a special 
relationship to that community which the execution of that person’s roles 
affects.  The Model Rules can be presented as a way in which the American 
Bar Association proposes that the bar regulate this competition among role 
partners for the lawyer’s attention and concern, placing the greatest importance 
in the lawyer’s loyalty-infused relationship with the individual client. 
B. The Centrality of the Duty of Loyalty (How Does Ethics Come Up?) 
If the student sees that a lawyer must choose between serving a client’s 
purposes and doing what the lawyer thinks, under other circumstances (in other 
social contexts), would be the right thing to do, the student dealing with this 
choice can see two potential ways out of the dilemma.  First, the student might 
take the radical relativist position and state that different people in different 
places see things differently, and all their views are equally valid.  The student 
may therefore insist on a reading of the norm most likely to help the lawyer 
succeed for the client and resist any suggestions for changes in the applicable 
rule that may make it more difficult to succeed for the client.  Second, the 
student might appeal to strong role differentiation and insist that things are 
different for lawyers, because of the lawyer’s function as guarantor of the 
client’s liberty and access to the legal system.  The problem of radical 
relativism has already received good treatment, and I refer the reader to 
Bradley Wendel’s lesson on how to respond to this position.23  The problem of 
role differentiation is dealt with above.24 
Most of the legal questions raised in the course can be discussed without 
asking the law student to refer to the student’s ethics.  Most questions about the 
exercise of discretion will be answered with reference to the lawyer’s legal 
duty of loyalty to the client and the exceptions to that duty in particular cases.  
The remaining questions concerning determining the right thing to do come up 
in two ways: 
(1)  The Model Rules, and state variations of those rules, deserve 
classroom consideration not only as a source of lawyer-regulatory law, but also 
with respect to their consistency with the limits on tolerable variation of 
cultural norms of adequate respect for persons, fairness, and justice.  Questions 
should be raised about the balance set by the Model Rules among the role-
 
 23. See W. Bradley Wendel, Ethics for Skeptics, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 165 (2002); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 711 
(2002).  As to the philosophical and practical problems raised when one denies a universally true 
ethics, but nevertheless takes ethics seriously, and must therefore deal with relativism, see 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 120–31 (1985). 
 24. See supra Part II.A. 
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partners25 competing for the lawyer’s attention and concern.26  Do the Rules 
strike the optimum balance given the harm done as a result?  The student 
discovers that the third person, likely to be affected adversely by the 
representation, is provided thin protection against the lawyer’s zeal.27 Agencies 
of government are given protection against the overzealous representation of a 
client, with respect to assuring the legitimacy and efficiency of their 
operations.28  Respect for law is enjoined, albeit gingerly.29  There is even a 
general prohibition on conduct that is inconsistent with that of a person of 
proper character (a nod to virtue ethics?),30 and a mysterious reference to a 
lawyer’s option not to take extreme measures for the client’s sake in the first 
comment to Rule 1.3.31  Here, the student is asked to look at the relevant rules 
from the point of view of a lawyer and from the point of view of another 
person (whose place in the social system might match one of the positions that 
might be occupied by the student).32  Can a lawyer adequately critique the 
 
 25. The Model Rules recognize different functional relationships between the lawyer and 
others.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007). 
 26. It is useful to compare the variations in various adopted versions of the Model Rules, for 
different judgments as to whether different third party claims on the lawyer’s concern are 
tolerable in terms of the efficient performance of the lawyer’s job for the client. 
 27. The lawyer’s responsibilities as an evaluator for third persons is dealt with in Rule 2.3, 
including the hesitantly-developed law of third-party liability for failure to exercise proper care in 
the writing of opinions and similar activity directed at third persons.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 2.3 (2007); see id. at R. 3.4 (pertaining to fairness in adversarial proceedings); id. at 
R. 4.1 (pertaining to making false statements, and, subject to the duty of confidentiality, 
preventing the effective commission of a crime or fraud by the client); id. at R. 4.2 (pertaining to 
protecting the attorney-client relationship of opponents); id. at R. 4.3 (pertaining to the treatment 
of unrepresented persons); id. at R. 4.4 (prohibiting harassment of third parties and violation of 
third parties’ legal rights in the course of obtaining evidence); see also id. at R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3), 
1.13(c) (providing exceptions to the duty of confidentiality). 
 28. Id. at R. 3.1–3.8.  Also consider Model Rule 3.9 with respect to appearances in 
nonadjudicative proceedings.  Id. at R. 3.9. 
 29. The lawyer may not “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”  Id. at R. 8.4(b).  Nor may a 
lawyer council or assist a client in “conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,” nor 
“knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is in violation of applicable rules of 
judicial conduct or other law.”  Id. at R. 1.2(d), 8.4(f). 
 30. Id. at R. 8.4. 
 31. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a 
client.  For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in 
determining the means by which a matter should be pursued.  See Rule 1.2.  The lawyer’s 
duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or 
preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and 
respect. 
Id.  For speculation as to what this means, see infra Appendix. 
 32. As noted earlier, once role-differentiated ethics bump up against the limits set by 
generally applicable cultural norms of conduct, the resulting dissonance will result in (a) a 
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rules that direct the lawyer’s conduct and purport to justify or excuse the 
lawyer’s activity’s social costs?33 
Subject only to the cryptic comment to Rule 1.3, noted above, the duty of 
loyalty seems to be peremptory, except as it is clearly made inapplicable by the 
rules themselves.  The lawyer is bound to serve the client with loyalty to seek 
the best and most efficient path to the client’s goals.  This means that the 
lawyer has no options, no way to other-favoring conduct (which would come at 
the expense of the client), but must choose between loyalty and disloyalty.  For 
example, if a lawyer receives an inadvertently sent fax or document and that 
fax or document reveals information that was confidential and thereby 
protected from disclosure to the lawyer or her client, then to the extent that the 
rules allow it, the lawyer must read and use the information in the document to 
the client’s advantage.34  This, even though the lawyer thinks it is somehow 
unfair, perhaps wrong, to peek and tell.35 
 
rejection of cultural norms by the person faced with the conflict or (b) a revision of the rules to 
keep them within the limits set by the cultural norms, either informally, by the lawyer’s conduct 
contrary to the rule, or formally, by official interpretation or actual revision of the relevant rule.  
See supra notes 20–21. 
 33. See supra note 14 (discussing justifications for role differentiated ethics in particular 
cases in which the lawyer’s role-directed conduct threatens or injures others). 
 34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2007). 
 35. However, consider the grant of discretion in Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4, which states 
that whether to return a mis-sent document unread is a decision that is “a matter of professional 
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.”  Id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 3.  The reference to Model Rules 
1.2 and 1.4 is odd, as they seem to deny, rather than grant, the lawyer discretion that is not subject 
to the client’s veto.  See also supra note 30.  Moreover, ordinary agency law should give the 
principal a veto with respect to this question.  One function of the duty of loyalty, after all, is to 
reduce the client’s agency costs of checking on the lawyer’s diligence and faithfulness to the 
principal.  To the extent that that duty (and the concomitant duty of confidentiality) is weakened, 
so is the value of the lawyer’s service to the client.  It is unlikely that the possibility of inadvertent 
disclosure seriously reduces the value to the client of the duty of confidentiality.  As to 
inadvertent disclosures, see Andrew M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory From Attorney 
Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767 (2005).  The 
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recently reversed its earlier 
strong position against reading and using the protected information.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).  This attitude in favor of loyalty over what 
might be termed “fair play” is reinforced by Formal Opinion 06-442, with respect to an attorney’s 
inspection of metadata in electronic documents, and by implication, metadata in other documents 
received from opponents.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 
(2006).  According to Formal Op. 06-442: 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not contain any specific prohibition against 
a lawyer’s reviewing and using embedded information in electronic documents, whether 
received from opposing counsel, an adverse party, or an agent of an adverse party.  A 
lawyer who is concerned about the possibility of sending, producing, or providing to 
opposing counsel a document that contains or might contain metadata, or who wishes to 
take some action to reduce or remove the potentially harmful consequences of its 
dissemination, may be able to limit the likelihood of its transmission by “scrubbing” 
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(2)  When does a lawyer have discretion to act in a way that conflicts with 
the client’s interests and the relevant rules? It is not always clear what sort of 
discretion the lawyer has beyond that to choose the best route to success for the 
client.  Generally, a lawyer can “go easy” on the opposition (e.g., by 
consenting to continuances or agreeing to a discovery regime that gives the 
opposing counsel greater ease in requesting and getting possibly damaging 
material) if the purpose of that move is to make the adversary process more 
smooth and less costly to the client, without reducing the client’s chance for 
success in the matter.36  But what of the lawyer’s sense that something is very 
wrong with the lawyer’s powerful pursuit of the client’s ends in the face of 
inadequate opposition or in those cases in which the opposition is (unfairly) 
hobbled by lack of information?  This suggests three questions for discussion: 
(i)  Questions should be raised about the appropriateness of simply 
ignoring the applicable rules in particular cases, especially those involving the 
divulgence of clients’ secrets to avoid or mitigate danger to third persons’ 
interests and those in which pursuit of the client’s interest with full zeal may 
result in an injustice.37 
(ii)  A related question regards the proper approach to interpreting rules, 
such as the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality or loyalty, in order to 
achieve a just or fair result despite the client’s wishes,38 as well as the rules 
against deceit,39 in order to help enforce legal duties of others or otherwise 
achieve a good end40 and to further the interests of the client.41 
 
metadata from documents or by sending a different version of the document without the 
embedded information. 
Id. 
 36. That may be all that the first comment to Model Rule 1.3 is about in its permission to 
counsel not to use the most aggressive measures in the client’s behalf.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007); see infra Appendix. 
 37. E.g., softening the lawyer’s adversarial zeal in order to make up for a failure in the 
adversary system of legal representation to assure a fair outcome.  The usual problem is that of 
the unrepresented or inadequately represented opponent.  How does a lawyer adjust to cases of 
that sort without losing the habit of zealous representation and reducing the value to clients of the 
duty of loyalty? 
 38. See infra Part II.D. 
 39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2007).  For the rules that govern 
advising or assisting the client to engage in such acts, see id. at R. 8.4(a), 1.2(d).  The Oregon 
Supreme Court took a hard-nosed position with respect to reading the relevant rule.  In re 
Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000).  As a result, Oregon changed its rule in order to 
accommodate approved lying: 
Notwithstanding DR 1-102(A)(1), (A)(3) and (A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(5), it shall not be 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others about or to supervise 
lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or 
constitutional rights, provided the lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these 
disciplinary rules. “Covert activity,” as used in this rule, means an effort to obtain 
information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other 
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(iii)  Finally, questions should be raised about the interpretation and 
implementation of rules that allow the lawyer to take action against the 
interests of the client.  How should the lawyer decide whether to exercise the 
option provided by such rules?  How should the lawyer decide how to exercise 
these options?  This is the subject of the next section of this essay. 
C. Permission to be Neither Loyal Nor Discreet 
Some of the Model Rules allow the lawyer to work against the client’s 
interests.  This might involve disclosure or use of information protected by the 
rule of confidentiality42 or it might involve the lawyer’s refusal of assistance.43  
The reason for allowing the lawyer to take such action may be the preservation 
of the lawyer’s own welfare, it might be the preservation of third parties from 
harm, or it might be to serve the interests of the community or an agency of 
that community (e.g., a court or legislature).  In any case, it must be clear that 
once the permission kicks in, the duty of loyalty to the client falls away.  This 
has to be the case because, were the duty of loyalty to remain in force, none of 
the permissions to act contrary to the client’s interests could be taken.  Without 
that duty, the constellation of claims on the lawyer’s attention and concern 
changes.  The lawyer’s role with respect to the client is devalued, as against the 
lawyer’s role with respect to third persons, tribunals, or those who depend on 
the lawyer for their own economic welfare.44 
 
subterfuge.  “Covert activity,” may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer as an 
advisor or supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable 
possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the 
foreseeable future. 
OR. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (2006). 
 40. See, e.g., In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002) (finding a prosecuting attorney who 
posed as a public defender in order to obtain a suspect’s surrender guilty of “conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”); see also W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth 
Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, Lying, and “Lying with an 
Explanation”, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 53 (2002) (discussing the Pautler case and other cases in which 
misleading statements were made by an attorney). 
 41. Here, one can talk about the difference between lying and “puffing,” or other deceitful 
practices in the service of the client.  The latest material on this subject published by the ABA is 
Formal Opinion 06-439, Lawyer’s Obligation of Truthfulness when Representing a Client in 
Negotiation: Application to Caucused Mediation. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006).  Most lawyers would agree that there is a difference 
between lying and “puffery” and argue that the latter is not deceitful.  Of course the “puffer” is 
likely “puffing” in order to persuade the other party to the negotiation to accept and act in 
accordance with the “puffing.”  It is also worth getting into the difference between misleading 
and lying statements in litigation.  See Hodes, supra note 40, at 67 (discussing defense tactics in 
the trial of David Westerfield for the abduction and murder of a child). 
 42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007). 
 43. Id. at R. 1.16. 
 44. E.g., partners or family members. 
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An interesting question45 is whether the permission granted under these 
rules is waivable?  It is interesting because it invites a discussion of the 
purpose of the permissions and their effect on the lawyer’s ethical duties to 
third persons.  I can think of three ways of looking at these permissions.  (a)  
They provide a safety valve for lawyers who need such a way out for their own 
mental health.  They are a kind of burn-out preventative.  The lawyer may 
serve her own interests at the expense of the client’s interests in tough 
circumstances.46  By this view, the exercise of the opportunity given by the 
exception is suboptimal with respect to the provision of legal services, but the 
harm is minimal given the small number of times the exception is likely to be 
relevant to the lawyer’s decision as to what to do.  (b)  They provide a reason 
for doing the right thing under special circumstances.  That is, the lawyer may 
choose to help others at the client’s expense.47  (c)  They are a judgment that 
the protection given the client by the rules with these exceptions is optimal for 
the provision of legal services.  The cost of these narrow exceptions to the 
client-attorney relationship is unimportant, which gives weight to the social 
interests that the lawyer serves in making use of them.  The balance struck 
between the claim of the client and all other claims on the lawyer’s concern is 
just right.  If this third reading is given the exceptions to the lawyer’s duties of 
confidentiality and loyalty, then the waiver of the permissions granted by the 
rules would give the client more protection than is deemed by the bar to be 
necessary to the proper and faithful delivery of legal services.  It is anomalous 
to allow the lawyer to give such extra protection and at the same time claim 
that what the lawyer does to the detriment of others in the client’s service is 
justified by role-differentiated ethics!  The choice is then between (a) the 
exceptions’ being a necessary evil, given the mental health of the lawyer, and 
(c) the exceptions’ being a recognition that the optimal availability of legal 
services includes taking these other interests (set out in the exceptions) into 
account.  To me, the third approach is the best understanding of the exceptions. 
The authors of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers48 
and those who drafted the preamble and comments to the Model Rules of 
 
 45. For this question, I thank the participants on the listserv for the Association of 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL).  See Association of Professional Responsibility 
Lawyers, http://www.aprl.net/ (last visited May 25, 2007). 
 46. For instance, see the “self defense” rule, Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), for an example of a 
plainly self-serving exception to the duty of confidentiality.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6(b)(5) (2007).  Additionally, see Model Rule 1.16(b) for the reasons for exit despite harm to 
the client under.  See id at R. 1.16(b). 
 47. This plainly does not fit the “self defense” rule.  See id. at R. 1.6(b)(5).  Nor does it fit 
the rules allowing the lawyer to withdraw to the client’s detriment in order to preserve the 
lawyer’s own pride, comfort, or financial health.  See id. at R. 1.16(b). 
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] TEACHING LEGAL PROFESSION 1175 
Professional Conduct49 seem to have lined up on the side of the safety-valve 
approach; they take a very permissive view of the lawyer’s decision to act, or 
the lawyer’s actions under these rules.50  The Restatement precludes discipline 
for acting or refusing to act according to the permission granted by the rules.  It 
does not, however, appear to preclude discipline for improper interpretation of 
the predicate conditions51 to the permission to act against the client’s interests.  
There seems, then, to be no prohibition on contracting away all these 
permissions by agreement.  The opposing view—that the permissions must be 
considered case-by-case and may not be waived—would require the lawyer to 
react at each circumstance in which the permission becomes possibly available. 
But even if this commentary makes arbitrary the lawyer’s decision whether 
and how to exercise the discretion granted by the Rules, it does not abate the 
ethical pressures behind these permissions.  Recall that there is no Rules-
recognized conflict between acting as permitted by the Rules and the Rules-
imposed duty of loyalty or confidentiality.52  It is also fair game for discussion 
as to whether the ALI and the ABA were mistaken in their implicit 
characterization of these rules’ permissions.53 
 
 49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).  Paragraph 14 of the Model Rules’ 
Preamble and Scope refers to the permissions discussed in this section and states: “No 
disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds 
of such discretion.”  Id. at ¶ 14. 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 66 cmt. g (2000); id. 
at § 67 cmt. k; id. at § 120 cmt. j, cmt. k (precluding contracting away the discretion to exclude 
testimony “reasonably believed to be false” with a reference to Rule 23(1)).  There is no other 
prohibition on contracting out of the exercise of discretion.  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 14 (2007) (refering to the permissions discussed in this section, and stating: 
“No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the 
bounds of such discretion.”). 
 51. The problem of interpretation as an ethics problem is discussed infra beginning at note 
56. 
 52. The rejection of any discipline-enforced duty to exercise discretion also does not 
preclude possible common law liability to third persons for conduct not required by the Model 
Rules.  Why not make contracts to waive exercise of these permissions unenforceable as a matter 
of “public policy”?  There is surely no problem of infecting lawyers’ decisions with conflicts of 
interest in such a move, any more than the permissions granted by the Rules to act in a way that is 
inconsistent with the client’s interest raises a problem of conflict of interests under the Rules. 
 53. It might also be worthwhile to ask whether, absent the threat of discipline protecting the 
third party, the common law should impose a duty of care on the lawyer with respect to the 
person who is harmed by the lawyer’s conduct and with whom the lawyer has a relationship in 
the course of his representation, where such conduct is not required by the lawyer’s ethics of role.  
See Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361, 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (denying such a duty).  
What should stand in the way of such a duty if the lawyer is perfectly capable of understanding 
the danger and avoiding it, and there is no countervailing duty of loyalty or confidentiality? 
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D. Deciding to Exercise the Option Not to be Loyal: Ethics of Interpretation 
There are two steps to be taken before the lawyer is in a position to act on 
the grant of discretion.  The first step is the interpretation of the predicate 
conditions for taking advantage of the permission.  The second step is the 
determination of what steps are permissible and which steps are mandatory.54  
How should the lawyer approach these steps?  As to the first step, how should 
the lawyer approach the problem of interpretation and application? 
As to the second step, to what extent should the lawyer take into account 
the possible harm from his actions to the client?  When considering what to do, 
the lawyer no longer has the strong duty of loyalty imposed by the lawyer’s 
role morality, but the client, as a person or as a representative of persons55 is 
still entitled to some consideration under general cultural norms requiring a 
good reason for harming someone.  Although that claim on the lawyer’s 
concern is that of a person with no special relationship to the lawyer, the 
person still has a claim on the lawyer’s concern with respect to the decision to 
act, just because the lawyer’s conduct may cause harm. 
As to the first step, interpretation of the predicate conditions, consider the 
problems raised by Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), which allows the lawyer to exclude 
evidence he “reasonably believes” is false: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false.  If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has 
offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal.  A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than 
the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is false.56 
 
 54. This includes only exceptions that become mandatory by virtue of the nature of the 
disclosure or harm to be voided by the disclosure.  This does not include exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality that are mandatory by virtue of the Rules, themselves, as in some states’ variations 
on Model Rule 1.6.  See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006) (“A lawyer shall 
reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from 
committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm.”); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, RPC 1.6 (b) (2006).  New Jersey’s variation on Rule 1.6(b) states: 
A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client or another person: 
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of another; 
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal. 
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RPC 1.6 (b) (2006). 
 55. I doubt that artificial persons are owed any ethical consideration except insofar as they 
represent the interests of humans. 
 56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007). 
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Does the interpretation of the predicate pose an ethical as well as a legal 
problem?57  It seems odd to think of interpretation as an ethical matter having 
to do with what one should do or how one should live.  But where there is 
more than one defensible reading of a rule, should one alternative be preferred 
given general norms against doing harm and according all persons equal 
concern, subject to duties to others?  That is, is there a preferred reading, given 
role morality and its limits?  The agent is asked in this case to determine 
whether a reading in favor of loyalty would trench too much on more general 
norms.58  But he is also asked to see to his role-moral duties to his client.  One 
particularly concerned with the possible cavalier treatment of the duty of 
loyalty in tough cases might be inclined rather easily to the position that the 
lawyer, still under that duty, must read the exception with a bias against the 
loyalty-denying act.  Such an approach limits the denial of loyalty to the 
narrowest range of cases.  However, this is permission that the Restatement 
prohibits the lawyer from waiving,59 which emphasizes the lawyer’s role 
relationship with the tribunal.  This suggests both that the lawyer’s permission 
to exclude evidence he “reasonably believes” is false amounts to a duty to 
exercise judgment and that the judgment should be exercised in a way that 
values strongly the role of the lawyer with respect to the tribunal in its search 
for the truth.60  This approach to reading the rule weakens the claim of the 
client to the lawyer’s loyalty when the lawyer is faced with a question of 
falsity of potential evidence. 
Rule 3.3(a)(3) limits the lawyer’s occasion for this exercise of discretion in 
the introduction of suspected false evidence to its introduction.61  If a lawyer 
comes to know that the lawyer, her client, or a witness called by her has 
presented evidence that the lawyer later “reasonably believes is false” remedial 
measures should be taken.62  What is the difference between offering 
“evidence that the lawyer knows to be false” and evidence that the lawyer 
 
 57. The task of interpretation is supposed to be one of finding out the “true” meaning of a 
written statement with respect to the problem at hand.  A reference to reasonable belief and 
necessity, however, does not point to a purely objective quantity.  It calls upon the lawyer to 
exercise judgment as to where there is sufficient information to justify a change in role-attitude. 
 58. See supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text (suggesting that general ethical 
principles impose outer limits on the extension of role morality’s potential to allow harm to 
others). 
 59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. j (2000). 
 60. One might call this role “officer of the court” or, as the Model Rules call it in the first 
paragraph of the preamble, “officer of the legal system.”  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).  Neither title has much content beyond a reference to the lawyer’s 
important participation in the processing of cases before a tribunal.  A lay-person representing 
herself in court would play the same role, to the extent she knows how to do it, and should have 
the same kind of duties to the tribunal. 
 61. See id. at R. 3.3(a)(3). 
 62. See id. 
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“reasonably believes is false”?  The definitions at the beginning of the Model 
Rules don’t help.  By these definitions, “‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge” 63 
and “‘reasonably’ when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the 
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.”64  So, a lawyer who 
“reasonably believes” that evidence is false must, as a reasonably competent 
lawyer, actually believe that it is false.  How does one distinguish between 
actually knowing (and therefore believing) something is false and just actually 
believing it? The verbal distinction between “reasonably believes” and 
“knows” already has been subjected to scholarly examination65 and much 
confusing and opaque judicial discussion.  One way to look at it, and preserve 
the distinction’s usefulness, is to make it into a distinction between moral 
certainty (knowledge) and belief based on less than information sufficient to 
base a moral certainty (reasonable belief). 
What must the ethical lawyer do at the stage of deciding whether to 
exercise discretion?  If it is impossible to distinguish reasonable belief from 
knowledge, then all the questionable evidence goes in.  If, on the other hand, 
the ethical lawyer can distinguish between the two, then he must ask: Is there 
any reason in ethics, given the constellation of roles that exists once the 
predicate condition of “reasonable belief” is met, that would persuade the 
lawyer nevertheless to introduce it despite such a reasonable belief?  If there is 
a reasonable suspicion of falsity of particular potential evidence, then as a 
practical matter, the second step is easy: may = must!  The ethical lawyer may 
not submit evidence that he “reasonably believes” is false.66 
Of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, three require that the 
lawyer “reasonably believes” disclosure is necessary to protect interests of 
third persons,67 and two allow the lawyer to reveal secrets in order to protect  
 
 63. Id. at R. 1.0(f). 
 64. Id. at R. 1.0(h). 
 65. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the 
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1271–73 (2003). 
 66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007). 
 67. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3). 
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of 
a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services . . . . 
Id. 
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himself.68  What is “reasonably believed necessary” to protect the lawyer’s 
interests under Rule 1.6(b)(5)69 is likely to be very broadly construed by the 
bar and the courts.70  Is there more to be said about exercising this option?  
More likely than not, the same liberality will be shown with regard to the 
lawyer’s determination of “reasonable belief” under Rule 1.6(b)(4), if only 
because it is an invitation to the conscientious lawyer to make sure he is in 
compliance with the rules. 
As to the first three exceptions, the area for lawyer’s discretion is more 
difficult to discern.  The lawyer must have a “reasonable belief” as to the 
importance of revelation of information to some future event—preventing or 
ameliorating harm.71  The future harm must be “reasonably certain.”72  Again, 
the lawyer (and the student) must ask about the level of skepticism with which 
a loyal lawyer must greet the information suggesting preventable or 
ameliorable harm and, indeed, whether the lawyer should seek further 
information (there being no duty under the Model Rules or in the Restatement 
to investigate further).  When death or substantial bodily harm is the thing to 
be prevented, I suspect the “reasonable belief” will be easier to achieve than it 
will in the case of harm to financial or property interests.73  But that, of course, 
does not end the inquiry.  What does, what must, the lawyer do?  By the 
language of the rule, a lawyer may ignore the consequences and keep the 
secrets, whether the impending danger is to a life or a business or an interest in 
 
 68. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(4)–(5). 
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; 
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the 
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations 
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client . . . . 
Id. 
 69. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(5). 
 70. See supra note 12. 
 71. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3) (2007). 
 72. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(1).  I read “reasonably certain” to modify both “death” and 
“substantial bodily harm” under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1). 
 73. Some states’ versions of the Model Rules take seriously the distinction between life and 
bodily injury on the one hand and harm to property or finances on the other, taking the former far 
more seriously in terms of required as opposed to voluntary disclosure (at least, in some states, 
with respect to information about criminal conduct).  See ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6 (2006); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1.6 (2006); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6 (2006); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 32:1.6 (2006); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006), N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RPC 1.6 (2006); N.M. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-106 (2006); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 
(2006); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT SCR 20:1.6 (2006). 
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property.74  With respect to the latter, notice that the lawyer, if involved in any 
way with the possible financial harm, may reveal the information to limit his 
own exposure to civil or criminal penalties for aiding the client’s fraud or 
crime, under the self-defense rule.75  Should it be harder for the lawyer to 
protect a third person from financial ruin than to protect the lawyer from civil 
liability? 
That the information was received in confidence, and that the lawyer 
induced the belief in confidentiality by her own actions, still counts for 
something, of course.  Revelation of secrets is very much like promise 
breaking in that it is allowed but only where the reason for the breach is plainly 
good enough.  The client, whatever she may have done and whatever the harm 
that might be done or threatened, is still entitled to the lawyer’s concern.  
Whatever the rule says, it should be easy to show that saving a life is the best 
thing to do, all things considered, given that the apparent necessity of the 
revelation to the saving of the life is questionable and that the harm to the 
client by the revelation is great. 
A fairly commonly given hypothetical case that raises both the problem of 
interpretation of predicate conditions and the problem of choice of action is 
one in which the client violates pollution law by letting arsenic flow into a lake 
used by others for fishing and swimming.  The amounts are small, but arsenic 
accumulates in the bones and eventually can kill.  If a person eats enough fish 
caught in the lake or if a person swims enough in the lake then the person will 
likely die.  Warn everyone now and the harm will certainly be prevented, but is 
that harm within the terms of the rule that allows the disclosure?  A lawyer 
who is neither a chemist nor a biologist believes that someone will die 
eventually.  He really doesn’t know how much arsenic is dangerous, how much 
fish from the lake has been consumed during the toxic emissions, or how many 
times each person swam in the lake and swallowed lake water.  Is that enough 
to go on?  If it is, must the lawyer tell?  The attitude of the lawyer to the 
problem is critically important, in my opinion. 
A client is married and has informed the lawyer that she is trying to 
conceive a child.  The information is confidential and relates to the 
representation.  The lawyer knows that she has been having an affair, and that 
the affair was broken off shortly after the lover was diagnosed HIV positive.  
The husband does not know of the affair and the client is anxious that he not 
find out.  Substantial bodily harm?  The family is wealthy and can easily afford 
treatment to palliate the effects of the infection.  But the husband is in danger 
of getting infected from the wife (or is he having an affair, etc.?), and then 
there is the potential person who will result from a successful attempt at 
conception.  That is all the lawyer knows.  He has no medical knowledge and 
 
 74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2007). 
 75. See id. at R. 1.6(b)(5). 
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is only aware of some of the more generally-accessible material on AIDS.  
May the lawyer tell?  Must the lawyer tell?  In both cases the problem the 
lawyer faces is not soluble by looking at the words of the Rule, nor is it by the 
purpose of the Rule.76 
Compare the case in which the harm to be prevented or ameliorated is 
financial and was or is likely to be caused by the client’s fraud or crime “in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services.”77  
The same sort of problem arises as to the satisfaction of the predicate, but it is 
less serious than is the danger posed to third persons in the preceding 
paragraph.  Does that make the decision to tell harder?  What of corporate 
counsel who is considering disclosure under Rule 1.13(c)?78  In the case of 
corporate counsel, the interests are different.  The lawyer’s role relationship 
with the client is mediated by people who, in law, have no claim on the 
lawyer’s loyalty.  Yet the revelation of the information, reasonably believed to 
be necessary to protect the client because of a probable violation of law that 
the lawyer reasonably believes is reasonably certain to harm the client, will 
plainly harm someone with whom the human relationship looks like a 
relationship of trust. 
The lawyer’s own interests are plainly in view with respect to the decision 
to terminate the representation.79  A reading of the catch-all phrase at the end 
 
 76. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.  Is the permission to disclose simply a 
safety-valve for the ethically-troubled lawyer, or is it a more powerful statement that such 
protection of confidentiality is not necessary to the socially optimal availability of legal 
assistance? 
 77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2007). 
 78. See id. at R. 1.13(c). 
Except as provided in paragraph (d), if 
(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that 
can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and 
appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization. 
Id. 
 79. I do not discuss the ethics of refusing or accepting a client.  That requires a different law 
review article.  On the other hand, there is some intertwining of the discussion of the ethics of 
refusing continued aid with the discussion of refusing the representation at the beginning.  There 
are two major differences: One is that there is traditionally a strong individualist undercurrent in 
our common culture, which strongly cuts in favor of the lawyer’s free choice; the other is that 
when the question of withdrawal from service comes up, there is already a relationship 
established with the client and some expectation on the part of the latter, consistent with the role 
of client with respect to that lawyer, of special consideration. 
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of the list of grounds for withdrawal80 as limited to the kinds of grounds 
already listed, would be in keeping with the often-cited rule of statutory 
interpretation, ejusdem generis.81  Once again, the ethics issue is raised by the 
existing human relationship between the client and the lawyer, and the 
continuing need of the client for legal help from a person who understands that 
client’s situation. 
Finally, there’s Rule 4.3, which allows a lawyer who is dealing “on behalf 
of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel” to advise that 
person to get a lawyer.82  In some cases, that advice could serve the lawyer’s 
own client by assuring a competent negotiation partner and hence a deal that 
will stand up.  In other cases, the advice could hinder the lawyer’s efforts to 
achieve success for the client.  The purpose of the rule seems to be to protect 
the unrepresented person’s interests.  It also protects the lawyer from 
inadvertently slipping into the role of lawyer to that third person, thereby 
sinking the lawyer into a conflict of interests that might compel the lawyer to 
withdraw from the case.  According to the District of Columbia Bar and The 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the lawyer may provide 
at least such advice to the third person.83  The Restatement position, which 
 
 80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2007) (“Except as stated in 
paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if . . . (7) other good cause for 
withdrawal exists.”). 
 81. “Ejusdem generis” is “a canon of construction that when a general word or phrase 
follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of 
the same type as those listed.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2001). 
 82. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2007). 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer 
shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.  When the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in 
the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.  The 
lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to 
secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a 
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the 
client. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 326 (2004), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion326.cfm; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000). 
A lawyer’s duty of reasonable care to a prospective client.  When a prospective client and 
a lawyer discuss the possibility of representation, the lawyer might comment on such 
matters as whether the person has a promising claim or defense, whether the lawyer is 
appropriate for the matter in question, whether conflicts of interest exist and if so how 
they might be dealt with, the time within which action must be taken and, if the 
representation does not proceed, what other lawyer might represent the prospective client.  
Prospective clients might rely on such advice, and lawyers therefore must use reasonable 
care in rendering it.  The lawyer must also not harm a prospective client through 
unreasonable delay after indicating that the lawyer might undertake the representation.  
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provides that the lawyer has a minimal duty of care to the third person, whether 
or not that third person opposes a current client of the lawyer’s, seems right.84  
It is consistent with the idea that the lawyer’s undivided loyalty to the client is 
justified by an oft-failed basic assumption of the adversary system, as stated in 
D.C. Bar opinion 326: 
  More basically, inherent in our adversary system is the principle that 
persons ought to be represented by competent lawyers and that disputes ought 
to be resolved on their merits.  Assisting a person to obtain competent 
representation is entirely consistent with that principle.  Once the issue is 
joined, a lawyer can and should take whatever lawful and ethical measures that 
are required to vindicate her client’s position.  Assisting an adversary to obtain 
competent representation, so that the issue can be joined, is not inconsistent 
with that duty.  It is consistent, however, with the lawyer’s obligation to the 
administration of justice.  At times, the interests of the legal system and the 
public interest may prevail over that of the client, e.g., Rule 3.3(a)(3).  We 
believe that recommending competent counsel to an unrepresented person, can 
never constitute prejudice to a client within the meaning of Rule 1.3(a).85 
This leaves the question of the lawyer’s knowledge about her clients—that 
advice to seek counsel might affect a client adversely—when such advice is 
actually to be disclosed.  I cannot find any reason for not advising the third 
person to get legal counsel (or, for that matter, that the period of limitations is 
running) when the lawyer is not aware that he represents the opponent.  The 
case law and the Restatement indicate that the lawyer must give such advice 
and, indeed, advise the client about the period of limitations.86  What if the 
lawyer knows that she represents the third person’s opponent and that getting a 
lawyer will put the third party in a better position to oppose her client?  Both 
the Restatement comment and the D.C. Bar opinion indicate that giving such 
advice does not conflict with the duty of loyalty.87  That is, there is no role-
 
What care is reasonable depends on the circumstances, including the lawyer’s expertise 
and the time available for consideration. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000). 
 84. For a contrary view, see Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950 (1994). 
 85. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 326 (2004), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion326.cfm. 
 86. See Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (affirming a 
finding that an attorney was guilty of negligence for failing to advise the plaintiff of the two-year 
medical malpractice limitations period); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000). 
 87. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 326 (2004), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinmions/opinion326.cfm; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000). 
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based reason for not providing it.  Hence, the Togstad case and the 
Restatement counsel in favor of providing it.88 
CONCLUSION 
The ethics of representation is a relatively small part of the course in the 
law governing lawyers.  It is unique to the course insofar as it calls upon the 
student to examine his or her own ethics as lawyers.  This is especially 
poignant for the student when confronted with the chance to make a decision 
that goes against the client’s interests, either by an act of civil disobedience—
open disloyalty in the name of the common good—or by accepting and 
exercising the discretion granted the lawyer by the rules.  In such discussions 
the student is compelled to recall that there are, in fact, norms to which that 
student has subscribed governing social conduct and that the student’s 
rationalization of conduct of questionable ethics must stand against the 
student’s own honest assessment of that conduct.  Of course, the student can 
deny ethical responsibility for conduct and take the strong self-serving position 
that both accepts the duty of loyalty (reduced to a legal duty) and at the same 
time fearlessly embraces the self-defense and similar rules that allow the 
lawyer to jump ship when the seas get too rough. 
What should be the instructor’s role in all of this?  Is the instructor a 
neutral observer, leading the student through the exercise but taking no 
position on the point of that exercise?  Neutrality should prevent the instructor 
from raising ethics issues at all.  Raising questions of ethics at least takes the 
position that those questions are important to the student.  Unfortunately, it is 
usually the instructor who will raise them. 
 
 88. See Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 694–95; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 15 cmt. e (2000). 
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APPENDIX 
 
RULE 1.3: A GRANT OF DISCRETION? 
 
Model Rule 1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”89  This formulation of the lawyer’s duty 
replaced various Disciplinary Rules (DRs) of the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility.90  DR 7-101, entitled “Representing a Client Zealously,” 
enjoined the lawyer to “seek the lawful objectives of his client through 
reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary 
Rules . . . .”91  Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.3 elaborates on the term 
“reasonable diligence”: 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, 
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful 
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.  A 
lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the 
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.  A lawyer is not 
bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a 
client.  For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional 
discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued.  See 
Rule 1.2.  The lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require 
the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in 
the legal process with courtesy and respect.92 
The first two sentences of this comment are consistent with the 
predecessors’ insistence on “zealous representation,” but the third sentence, 
italicized in the above quote, seems to say that the lawyer may decide to bank 
the fires of zeal and refuse to “press for every advantage that might be realized 
for a client.”93  It is a grant of discretion with respect to “the means by which a 
matter should be pursued,” but what sort discretion; as to what?  Might it be: 
(a) full discretion as to means, in order to avoid harsh or unfair measures?94 
 
 89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007). 
 90. The relevant DRs are 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(1,3).  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A)(1), (3) (1983). 
 91. Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1). 
 92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
 94. A comment is a strange place for such a large grant of discretion—discretion to choose a 
less effective means for the sake of fairness.  For another odd apparent grant of discretion free of 
the client’s veto, see Comment 3 to Model Rule 4.4, which allows the lawyer to refuse to read a 
mis-sent document and return the document to opposing counsel.  See id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 3.  That 
move could prevent the lawyer from using information beneficial to the client’s cause, which 
would seem to violate, or disregard the duty of loyalty to the client.  For more on that comment, 
see supra note 35.  I suspect that the decision to read or not read, return or not return, will be 
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(b) full discretion as to means in those cases in which the selection of means is 
not important to the expeditious achievement of the client’s ends? (c) 
discretion to adjust the lawyer’s conduct to prevailing norms of conduct in the 
locality or the other social context in which the lawyer practices? 
The decisions as to both ends and means are up to the client according to 
Model Rule 1.2(a).95  As to ends, the client controls.  As to means, the lawyer 
must consult with the client who, by the ordinary rules of agency law, may 
order the lawyer to take such means as the lawyer may pursue legally.  The 
lawyer’s only way out is to resign, if that is allowed.96  Unless there is some set 
of “means” that are beyond the reach of the terms of Model Rule 1.2(a), either 
Comment 1 is at war with Rule 1.2(a) or there is nothing to which the grant of 
discretion in Comment 1 of Model Rule 1.3 applies.  Means to which Rule 
1.2(a) does not apply includes means as to which there is no chance to confer 
with the client reasonably or intelligently, such as decisions as to tactics in 
court or in negotiation.97  But, even here, does not the duty of loyalty to the 
client command that counsel choose the most efficient means to achieve the 
client’s ends? Before concluding that it means nothing whatever, perhaps a 
look at the history of this provision will help determine what sort of discretion 
it gives the lawyer to choose conduct that does not further, and may hinder, the 
pursuit of the client’s objectives. 
The closest ancestors to Comment 1 of Model Rule 1.3 are DR 7-101, and 
Ethical Considerations (ECs) 7-9, 7-10, and 7-38 of the 1983 Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  The Disciplinary Rule, which commands the 
lawyer to pursue the client’s goals with all legal means, states that: 
[a] lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however, by acceding to 
reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of 
his client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by 
avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all 
persons involved in the legal process.98 
 
made according to local custom, which is a limit on the duty of zealous loyalty that may be 
referred to in Comment 1 to Rule 1.3. 
 95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007).  The relevant provision states 
that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, 
as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued.”  Id. at R. 1.2(a).  Model Rule 1.4 requires that the lawyer provide information sufficient 
to let the client “make informed decisions regarding the representation.”  Id. at R. 1.4(b). 
 96. See id. at R. 1.16(b).  “[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if . . . the 
client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has 
a fundamental disagreement . . . .”  Id. at R. 1.16(b)(4).  The 2001 version of this Model Rule 
limited the lawyer’s option to leave cases in which the lawyer found “an objective . . . repugnant.”  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2001). 
 97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 3 (2007). 
 98. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1983). 
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Both ECs 7-9 and 7-10 enjoin the lawyer to seek the “best interests of his 
client” (EC 7-9)99 and “represent his client with zeal” (EC 7-10).100  But, 
according to EC 7-9, “when an action in the best interests of his client seems to 
him to be unjust, he may ask his client for permission to forego such action.”101  
EC 7-10 adds that the duty to the client “does not militate against his 
concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the 
legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.”102  EC 7-38 advises 
the lawyer to be courteous to opposing counsel and to “accede to reasonable 
requests . . . which do not prejudice the rights of his client,” and to “follow 
local customs of courtesy or practice” or give notice of an intention not to.103 
Farther back along this provision’s family tree lie the 1963 ABA Canons 
of Professional Ethics.  Canon 5 limits the defender of the criminally accused 
to “all fair and honorable means.”104  The Canon goes on to condemn “the 
suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses” by the prosecutor.105  Canon 
15 states that a lawyer does not have “the duty . . . to do whatever may enable 
him to succeed in winning his client’s cause,” but also insists that the lawyer 
exert “entire devotion to the interest of the client.”106  Canon 17 distinguishes 
between serving the client’s “ill feeling” toward the other side and pursuing the 
client’s interests.107  The latter is commanded, the former should be avoided.108  
Moreover, a lawyer should not attack opposing counsel’s character or 
deportment.109  Canon 18 adds an injunction against ministering to the client’s 
“malevolence or prejudices” and calls upon the lawyer to treat “adverse 
witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration.”110  Canon 22 calls 
upon the lawyer in court to act “with candor and fairness,” but this Canon is 
generally concerned with truthfulness and respect for applicable law in the 
presentation of legal argument or evidence.111  More informative is Canon 24, 
which relates to “the incidents of the trial.”112  It calls for consideration of the 
other side’s convenience when it does not “[work] substantial prejudice to the 
 
 99. Id. at EC 7-9. 
 100. Id. at EC 7-10. 
 101. Id. at EC 7-9. 
 102. Id. at EC 7-10. 
 103. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1983). 
 104. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (1963). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 15. 
 107. Id. at 17. 
 108. See id. 
 109. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 17 (1963). 
 110. Id. at 18. 
 111. Id. at 22. 
 112. Id. at 24. 
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rights of the client,” including refusing to accept a continuance “when no harm 
will result from a trial at a different time.”113 
These comments, ECs, and canons point in two directions.  In one 
direction lies the enthusiastic furtherance of the client’s goals subject only to 
the client’s informed decision as to tactics and objectives, rendering Comment 
1 to Rule 1.3 meaningless.  In the other direction lies what seems to be a 
reference to the current rules of etiquette governing deportment in those social 
contexts (in court, responding to discovery requests, negotiating, etc.) in which 
the attorney finds herself the course of the representation.  Yet, the Canons and 
the ECs seem always to return to the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation 
and seem to limit acts of consideration to acts that do not make much of a 
difference to the client’s ultimate success; acts of inexpensive consideration for 
others.  If one wanted to draw a map showing the resulting tendency of the 
applicable rules of conduct as set forth in the Canons, the Code, and the black 
letter Rules, the resultant always points in the direction of achieving success 
for the client, leaving the reference to consideration for others and etiquette to 
those situations in which the client’s ultimate victory is not prejudiced. 
If harsh tactics are more likely than soft tactics to gain a good result at less 
cost, may the lawyer choose the latter over the former without seeking the 
client’s informed approval or despite the client’s refusal to consent?  If the 
answer is “no,” then what is the point of the phrase holding the lawyer not to 
be bound to “press for every advantage that might be realized for a client?”  
Yet, the answer seems to be “no” in all cases in which the choice of tactic can 
make a difference between success and failure.  The phrase in question then is 
simply a recommendation against unnecessary roughness. 
There is one more place to look for some content in the statement in 
Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.3—the customs of the community in which the 
lawyer works.114  The lawyer must work for clients who have their own ideas 
of their goals and what is permitted in the pursuit of those goals, trumping the 
less aggressive measures that the lawyer ordinarily would favor.  A lawyer 
desiring to maintain a functioning and profitable relationship with a client will 
be influenced by that client’s ideas and attitudes regarding the reasonableness 
and rightness of harsh measures in the pursuit of the client’s ends.  The lawyer 
must work in a particular community of lawyers and judges, and that 
community may have a normative substructure that simply rejects particular 
tactics, however necessary they might be in the pursuit of success for the 
 
 113. Id. at 24. 
 114. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1983) (“He should follow local 
customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention 
not to do so.”). 
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client.115  Perhaps the puzzling phrase in Comment 1 of Model Rule 1.3 is 
there to allow the lawyer to conform to the customs of the community in which 
she functions,116 for the protection of her reputation and in furtherance of her 
ability to represent others, even though such conduct might prejudice the 
interests of the relevant client. 
 
 115. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WISC. L. 
REV. 1529, 1544–49 (1984); W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods of Enhancing the 
Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV 967, 979 (2003). 
 116. By “community” I include, among other things, a group of attorneys with whom the 
attorney in question is a “repeat player,” and the courts or administrative tribunals before which 
the attorney in question appears with some frequency.  This conflict between the lawyer’s need to 
conform to “local” custom and the zealous pursuit of the client’s interests is one of several 
unavoidable conflicts of interest in the practice of law that necessarily compromises the duty of 
loyalty.  See Dennis J. Tuchler, Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest and the Duty of Loyalty, 44 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1025 (2000). 
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